# TOP SECRET SUEDE

GENERAL

· 11 Jun 52

·

	ssistant Secretary General Zinchenko's	
	proach to an Israeli UN delegate suggest- g a new formula for the Korean armistice	
ne	gotiations is of major importance, in the nan in Moscow. Zinchenko's suggestion	
appears aimed at a virtual	cease-fire in Korea without final and for- er-of-war issue to be handled by an overt	
"agreement to disagree," ar ments tending to minimize	nd possibly by subsequent informal arrange-	
	ne Ambassador believes that any solution uld have to be along some such line as that	
Co	omment: In addition to conveying a possi-	
ble way around the prisoner the Israeli delegate could be bear upon the United States the Russian suggestion has	omment: In addition to conveying a possi- r-of-war impasse, the Soviet 'feeler' to e another effort to bring UN pressure to to modify its stand in Korea. Reportedly, already been echoed in part by other	
ble way around the prisoner the Israeli delegate could be bear upon the United States the Russian suggestion has	r-of-war impasse, the Soviet 'feeler' to e another effort to bring UN pressure to to modify its stand in Korea. Reportedly,	] ,
ble way around the prisoner the Israeli delegate could be bear upon the United States the Russian suggestion has	r-of-war impasse, the Soviet 'feeler' to e another effort to bring UN pressure to to modify its stand in Korea. Reportedly,	
ble way around the prisoner the Israeli delegate could be bear upon the United States the Russian suggestion has	r-of-war impasse, the Soviet 'feeler' to e another effort to bring UN pressure to to modify its stand in Korea. Reportedly,	
ble way around the prisoner the Israeli delegate could be bear upon the United States the Russian suggestion has	r-of-war impasse, the Soviet 'feeler' to e another effort to bring UN pressure to to modify its stand in Korea. Reportedly,	
ble way around the prisoner the Israeli delegate could be bear upon the United States the Russian suggestion has	r-of-war impasse, the Soviet 'feeler' to e another effort to bring UN pressure to to modify its stand in Korea. Reportedly,	
ble way around the prisoner the Israeli delegate could be bear upon the United States	r-of-war impasse, the Soviet 'feeler' to e another effort to bring UN pressure to to modify its stand in Korea. Reportedly,	

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 23-Mar-2010

TOP SECRET SUEDE

 TOP SEC	[C.[ ] [S	
	 	·

NR

#### FAR EAST

### 4. UN walkout at Panmunjom causes Communist concern:

Chinese Communist
Military
7 June 52
SUEDE
SUEDE
Stated to be the UN's 'bad' attitude at Panmunjom.
Headquarters of the Chinese Communist
"Volunteer" Forces in Korea on 7 June
alerted at least two tactical units to "guard
against an enemy attack" and to prepare for
combat. The basis of the enemy alert was

- 4 -

# TOP SECRET SUEDE

# TOP SECRET SUEDE

Comment: Apparently the Communist command construed the UN's walkout as an ultimatum. Kim Il-sung's and Peng Teh-huai's 9 June open letter to General Clark shows how serious the Communists consider the three-day recess. This form of communication is reserved for important proposals, and in the letter General Clark was urged to "order your delegates to return to Panmunjom" if the UN still desired an armistice in Korea.

President Rhee has reacted negatively to UNCURK's proposal of 7 June that a compromise solution be found to the South Korean political dispute, according to the commission's	
chairman. At a meeting with the commission on 9 June, Rhee's only interest was to get his constitutional amendments adopted. He quoted his Prime Minister as reporting that the Assembly is "coming around" to his viewpoint.	
Ambassador Muccio comments that the state-	
ment allegedly made by the Prime Minister is not understandable in view of the fact that he had expressed doubt on 7 June that the Assembly opposition would be willing to compromise or capitulate.	
view of the fact that he had expressed doubt on 7 June that the Assembly	

TOP SECRET SUEDE